

Ausnutzung von CPU-Sicherheitslücken

Meltdown


TECH SESSION!

Ausnutzung von CPU-Sicherheitslücken Meltdown



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8COM
CYBER SECURITY



Meltdown


- ✓ CPU vulnerability that breaks fundamental isolation between OS and applications
- ✓ Break KASLR, read all memory, dump hashes, etc.
- ✓ All Intel and some ARM CPUs are affected
- ✓ Mitigation possible via microcode and OS updates (PTI)



MELTDOWN


Virtual Memory

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Virtual Memory

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Page Table

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
- ✓ Isolation of memory between processes and user/kernel
- ✓ E.g. User can't access kernel memory @ 0xffff....
 - Leads to a segmentation fault

Terminal

```
void main() {  
    char data = *(char*)0xffff888000000000;  
    printf("%c\n", data);  
}
```


Terminal

```
> ./segfault  
zsh: segmentation fault (core dumped) ./segfault
```



Direct Physical Map

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Side-Channel Attack: Flush+Reload

Flush+Reload

- ✓ CPU stores recently accessed variables in cache

```
println!("{var}");  
println!("{var}");
```


CPU

RAM

Side-Channel Attack: Flush+Reload

Flush+Reload


- ✓ CPU stores recently accessed variables in cache



Side-Channel Attack: Flush+Reload

Flush+Reload


- ✓ CPU stores recently accessed variables in cache



Side-Channel Attack: Flush+Reload

Flush+Reload


- ✓ CPU stores recently accessed variables in cache
- ✓ Latency can be measured (4 to 80 cycles for cache hit, 200+ for cache miss)



Side-Channel Attack: Flush+Reload

Flush+Reload

- ✓ Attacker and victim have shared memory
- ✓ Attacker flushes shared memory out of cache
- ✓ Victim may access it
- ✓ Attacker can measure latency to check whether victim accessed it



Microarchitecture

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
- ✓ Implementation of Instruction Set
- ✓ Instruction Set may be ARM, x86, MIPS, etc...
- ✓ Microcode can be updated to enable/disable features or fix bugs

```
60fa:    e8 d1 f6 ff ff    call    0x57d0
60ff:    ba 05 00 00 00    mov     edx,0x5
6104:    48 8d 35 dd 13 00 00    lea     rsi,[rip+0x13dd]
610b:    31 ff             xor     edi,edi
610d:    48 89 c5          mov     rbp,rax
6110:    ff 15 5a 3d 00 00    call    QWORD PTR [rip+0x3d5a]
6116:    48 89 c3          mov     rbx,rax
6119:    ff 15 f9 3c 00 00    call    QWORD PTR [rip+0x3cf9]
611f:    48 89 e9          mov     rcx,rbp
6122:    48 89 da          mov     rdx,rbx
```

Example of x86 instructions

Single Skylake CPU Core

- ✓ Front End: Fetches Instructions from L1 Instruction Cache & Decodes them into microOps
- ✓ Execution Engine: Performs optimizations on microOps (rename, retire, **reordering**) & sends microOps to ports to execute (Tomasulo's algorithm)



Out-of-order Execution

- ✓ Reduce pipeline stalling, e.g. perform slow load operation from memory
- ✓ `inc rsi` and `add rsi, rcx` are independent of `rax`
→ can be performed while waiting on memory access @ `rbx + 8`

<code>mov rax, [rbx + 8]</code>	<code># move value from memory @ rbx+8 into rax</code>
<code>inc rsi</code>	<code># increase rsi by 1</code>
<code>add rsi, rcx</code>	<code># rsi = rsi + rcx</code>


Out-of-order Execution

- ✓ 4: Try to read a byte of kernel memory into register al → Triggers SEGFAULT
- ✓ 5: Multiply al by 4096 (Page Size)
- ✓ 7: Transient Execution of accessing probe array with rax as offset
- ✓ Use Flush+Reload to see which page of probe array was accessed

```
1 ; rcx = kernel address
2 ; rbx = probe array
3 retry:
4 mov al, byte [rcx]
5 shl rax, 0xc
6 jz retry
7 mov rbx, qword [rbx + rax]
```

Direct Physical Map

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Demo

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Mitigations

Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI)

- ✓ Don't map kernel address space and physical address space into process in user mode
- ✓ Needs flushing of translation-lookaside buffer (TLB) → Performance impact

Add Jitter to Timing Measurements

- ✓ Questionable

Further Resources

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[Meltdown Paper](#)

[Wikichip Skylake](#)

Sie haben noch Fragen?
Sprechen Sie mich gerne an!



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